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I. INTRODUCTION
An important aspet in many modern ommuniation systems is the ability to exlude unauthorized parties from
gaining aess to ondential material. Although ryptosystems in general have an extensive history, until fairly
reently they have been based on simple variations of the same theme: information seurity among authorized parties
relies on sharing a seret key whih is to be used for enryption and deryption of transmitted messages. While in this
way ondentiality of the sent message may be seured, suh systems suer from the (obvious) drawbak of non-seure
key distribution.
In 1978 Rivest, Shamir and Adleman rst devised a way to resolve this problem whih led to the elebrated RSA
publi-key ryptosystem [1℄ (for historial auray, a similar system has been suggested years earlier in the British
GCHQ but was kept seret). The idea behind publi key ryptosystems is to dierentiate between the enryption- and
deryption-keys; private key(s) are assigned to authorized users, for deryption purposes, while transmitting parties
only need to know the mathing enryption (publi) key [2℄. The two keys are related by a funtion whih generates the
enryption mehanism from the deryption key with low omputational osts, while the opposite operation (evaluating
the deryption key from the enryption mehanism) is omputationally infeasible. Suh funtions are alled `one-way'
or trap-door funtions; the RSA algorithm for instane, is based on the intratability of fatorizing large integers
generated by taking the produt of two large prime numbers.
The proliferation of digital ommuniation in the last few deades has brought in a demand for seure ommuni-
ation leading to the invention of several other publi-key ryptosystems, most notable of whih are the El-Gammal
ryptosystem (based on the Disrete Logarithm problem), systems based on ellipti urves and the MEliee ryp-
tosystem (based on linear error-orreting odes) [3℄. A ommon denominator of all publi-key algorithms is the high
omputational omplexity of the task faing the unauthorized user; this is typially related to hard omputational
problems that annot be solved in pratial time sales.
A new publi-key ryptosystem based on a diluted Ising spin-glass system has been reently proposed in [4℄.
The suggested ryptosystem is similar in spirit to that of MEliee and relies on exploiting physial properties of
the MaKay-Neal (MN) low-density parity-hek (LDPC) error-orreting odes. In partiular, in the ontext of
MN odes it has been shown [4{6℄ that for ertain parameter values suessful deoding is highly likely, while for
others (partiularly when the number of parity-heks per bit and the number of bits per hek tend to innity) the
`perfet' solution, desribing full retrieval of the sent message, admits only a very narrow basin of attration; iterative
algorithmi solutions lead in this ase, almost ertainly, to a deryption failure. One an use these properties to
devise an LDPC based ryptosystem [4℄. The narrow basin of attration ensures that a random initialization of the
deryption equations will fail to onverge to the plaintext solution while the naive approah of trying all possible
initializations is learly doomed for a suÆiently large plaintext size. The `one-way' funtion relies on the hard
omputational task of deomposing a dense matrix (the publi key) into a ombination of sparse and dense matries
(private keys) [7℄.
In this paper we examine the suggested ryptosystem from an adversary's viewpoint. We onsider an unauthorized
party that has aquired partial or full knowledge of one or more of the private keys, and/or of the message, and we
evaluate the ritial knowledge levels required for unauthorized deryption. In addition, we examine the deryption
reliability by authorized users due to the probabilisti nature of the ryptosystem.
The paper is organized as follows: In the following setion we give an outline of the suggested ryptosystem. In
setion III we formulate unauthorized-deryption senarios with partial knowledge based on a statistial mehanial
2framework. In setion IV we derive the observable quantity that measures deryption suess of the unauthorized user
as a funtion of the attak parameters and in setion V we examine various ases and present numerial results as well
as the related phase diagrams. In setions VI and VII we briey study the basin of attration of the ferromagneti
solution, and the reliability of the deryption mehanism (for authorized users), respetively. The impliation of the
analysis are disussed in setion VIII.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE CRYPTOSYSTEM
The ryptosystem suggested in [4℄ is based on the framework of MN error-orreting odes [5℄. An outline of the
enryption/deryption proess is as follows.
A plaintext represented by  2 f0; 1g
N
is enrypted to the iphertext r 2 f0; 1g
M
(with M > N) using a predeter-
mined generator matrix G 2 f0; 1g and a orrupting vetor  2 f0; 1g
M
with P (
i
) = p Æ

i
;1
+ (1   p) Æ

i
;0
for eah
omponent 1  i M ; the Kroneker tensor Æ
ab
returns 1 when the arguments are equal (a = b) and zero otherwise.
The generated iphertext is of the form:
r = G +  (mod 2) (1)
The (M N) matrix G together with the orruption rate p 2 [0; 1℄ onstitute the publi key.
The enryption matrix G is onstruted by hoosing a dense matrixD (of dimensionalityMM) and two randomly-
seleted sparse matries A (of dimensionality M N) and B (of dimensionality M M) through G = B
 1
AD (mod
2). The matries A and B are haraterized by K and L non-zero elements per row and C and L non-zero elements
per olumn respetively. The resulting dense matrix G is modeled as being haraterized by K
0
and C
0
non-zero
elements per row and per olumn respetively with K
0
; C
0
! 1 (while K
0
=C
0
= N=M is nite). In fat, the dense
matrix G is of an irregular form due to the inverse of the sparse matrix B as well as the produt taken with the dense
matrix D; we will model the matrix G by a regular dense matrix to simplify the analysis. The parameters K;C and
L dene a partiular ryptosystem while the matries A, B and D onstitute the private key.
The authorized user may obtain the plaintext from the reeived iphertext r by taking the (mod 2) produt
Br = A +B. Finding a set of solutions  and  suh that the equation
A +B = A +B (mod 2) (2)
is true will lead to andidate solutions of the deryption problem (of whih the most probable one will be deteted
aording to a further seletion riterion). For partiular hoies of K and L, solving the above equation an be
ahieved via iterative methods whih have ommon roots in both graphial models and physis of disordered systems
suh as Belief Propagation [5℄ Belief Revision [8℄ and more reently Survey Propagation [9℄; where state probabilities
for the derypted message bits P (;  jr) are alulated by solving iteratively a set of oupled equations, desribing
onditional probabilities of the iphertext bits given the plaintext and vie versa. This problem is idential to the
deoding problem of a regular MN error-orreting ode; for the expliit iterative deoding equations see equations (55-
56) as well as [5, 10℄.
The unauthorized user, on the other hand, faes the task of nding the most probable solutions to the equation
G +  = G +  (mod 2) : (3)
The above deryption equation is eetively idential to the deoding problem of Sourlas error-orreting odes [11℄,
with the publi matrix G being dense. Most notably, in the ontext of Sourlas odes, nding solutions to (3) is strongly
dependent on initial onditions: for all initial onditions other than the plaintext itself, the iterative equations of Belief
Propagation will fail to onverge to the plaintext solution [4{6, 12℄ suh that obtaining the orret solution for (3)
without knowledge of the private key will beome infeasible. Obtaining the private keys by deomposing G into A, B
and D is known to be a hard omputational problem even if the values of K, C and L are known [7℄.
We would like to point to the fat that there may exist more than one triplet of matries fA;B;Dg suh that
G = B
 1
AD. with D being a dense matrix, nding a set of matries A
0
, B
0
and D
0
suh that their ombination
produes G = (B
0
)
 1
A
0
D
0
requires an exponentially diverging number of operations, with respet to the system size,
making the deomposition omputationally infeasible. For D = 1 (as was the original formulation in [4℄) nding a
pair of sparse matries A
0
and B
0
suh that G = (B
0
)
 1
A
0
requires only a number of operations that is polynomial in
N , and the ryptosystem is therefore not seure.
Other advantages and drawbaks of the new ryptosystem appear in [4℄.
3III. FORMULATION OF THE ATTACK
An essential ingredient of any ryptosystem is a ertain level of robustness against attaks. The robustness of the
urrent ryptosystem against attaks with no additional seret information has already been reported in [4℄. In this
setion we study the vulnerability of the new ryptosystem to various attaks, haraterized by partial knowledge of
the seret keys and/or the plaintext itself; the additional information manifests itself in a set of deryption equations
similar to (2) in whih partial information of the seret keys (and plaintext) is used in onjuntion with the publily
available information of (3).
The umulative information provided by the dierent sets of equations will potentially allow for a suessful deryption.
To this extent, knowledge of the matrix B is of utmost importane sine obtaining partial knowledge of the syndrome
vetor and equation (2) is only aessible through deryption using the matrix B. Let us onsider that an unauthorized
user has aquired knowledge of a number of rows 
A
M , 
B
M and 
D
M of the seret matries A, B and D (with

?
2 [0; 1℄). Relation (2) then provides M  minf
A
; 
B
; 
D
gM deryption equations (4) based on sparse matries.
To analyze the attak we will thus from now on assume that a blok (M M) of all matries is known to the
unauthorized user with  2 [0; 1℄. In this ase, the produts
P
M
j=1
B
ij
r
j
for i = 1; : : : ; M an be taken and the
unauthorized user will arrive at the following deryption problem:
private : (
^
A)
i
+ (
^
B )
i
= (
^
A)
i
+ (
^
B)
i
for rows i = 1; : : : ; M (4)
publi : (G)
i
+ (I )
i
= (G)
i
+ (I)
i
for rows i = 1; : : : ;M (5)
where we absorbed the matrix D using  ! D and  ! D; in pratie, after deryption, one will have to use of
the inverted matrix D
 1
to obtain the original plaintext. All solutions  and  will have to simultaneously satisfy
(4) and (5). The matries
^
A and
^
B will be desribed by K and L non-zero elements per row. The average number of
known non-zero elements per olumn in
^
A and
^
B will be denoted C and L, respetively. Sine  is the probability of
seleting a non-zero element in the known part of the private key it follows that C = C and L = L. For all olumns
j = 1; : : : ;M we will denote the number of non-zero elements in
^
A and
^
B by the random variables
~
C
j
(=
P
M
i=1
^
A
ij
)
and
~
L
j
(=
P
M
j=1
^
B
ij
) whih are desribed by the distributions:
P (
~
C
j
;C) =

C
~
C
j


~
C
j
(1  )
C 
~
C
j
~
C
j
= 0; : : : ; C (6)
P (
~
L
j
;L) =

L
~
L
j


~
L
j
(1  )
L 
~
L
j
~
L
j
= 0; : : : ; L (7)
To failitate the statistial mehanial desription we will now replae the eld f0; 1;+(mod 2)g by the more familiar
Ising spin representation [11℄ f 1; 1;g. Equations (4) and (5) will also be modied: From the matries
^
A;
^
B and
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j
FIG. 1: The matrix B of dimensionality M M used as a private key in deryption. The senario we onsider here is that
unauthorized users have aquired knowledge of M rows of the matrix. The (M M) blok may have
~
L
j
= 0; : : : ; L non-zero
elements per olumn for all j.
4G; I we onstrut the binary tensors A = fA
hi
1
i
K
;j
1
j
L
i
; 1  i
1
<    < i
K
 N; 1  j
1
<    < j
L
 Mg and
G = fG
hi
1
i
K
0
;ji
; 1  i
1
<    < i
K
0
 N; 1  j  Mg. The elements of these tensors are A
hi
1
:::i
K
;j
1
:::j
L
i
= 1
if
^
A and
^
B have respetively a row in whih the elements fi
1
; : : : ; i
K
g and fj
1
; : : : ; j
L
g are all 1 and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, G
hi
1
:::i
K
0
;ji
= 1 if G and I have respetively a row in whih the elements fi
1
;    ; i
K
0
g and fjg are all 1
and 0 otherwise. The notation we used to indiate tensor elements, hi
1
: : : i
K
i, denotes that the sites i
1
; : : : ; i
K
are
ordered and dierent.
The fat that the number of non-zero elements per olumn in
^
A;
^
B and G; I , respetively, are
~
C
i
;
~
L
i
and C
0
; 1, for
all olumns, will be imposed by the onstraints:
X
i
2
i
K
;j
1
j
L
A
hi
1
i
K
;j
1
j
L
i
=
~
C
i
1
8i
1
= 1;    ;M (8)
X
i
1
i
K
;j
2
j
L
A
hi
1
i
K
;j
1
j
L
i
=
~
L
j
1
8j
1
= 1;    ;M (9)
X
i
2
i
K
0
;j
G
hi
1
i
K
0
;ji
= C
0
8i
1
= 1;    ;M (10)
X
i
1
i
K
0
G
hi
1
i
K
0
;ji
= 1 8j = 1;    ;M (11)
To ompress notation in what follows we will denote the set of indies involved in the tensors A and G by 
K
=
hi
1
   i
K
i and 

L
= hj
1
   j
L
i.
For the system desribed in (4-5) the mirosopi state probability P (;  ) an be written as
P (;  j; ;A;G) =
1
Z
[(;  ; ; ;A) (;  ; ; ;G) (; ) ( ; )℄ e
 H(; )
(12)
(notie that the dependene on ;  is not expliit, but through the reeived vetor r) where Z is the partition funtion
and H(;  ) the energy:
H(;  ) =  F

N
X
i=1

i
  F

M
X
j=1

j
(13)
with F

=
1
2
log
1 p

p

and F

=
1
2
log
1 p

p

. The elds F

and F

represent prior knowledge of the statistis from
whih the plaintext and the orrupting vetor are drawn, suh that
P (
i
) = (1  p

)Æ

i
;1
+ p

Æ

i
; 1
p

2 [0; 1℄ (14)
P (
j
) = (1  p

)Æ

j
;1
+ p

Æ

j
; 1
p

2 [0; 1℄ (15)
The indiator funtions (;  ; ; ;A) and (;  ; ; ;G) restrit the spae of solutions  2 f 1; 1g
N
and  2
f 1; 1g
M
to those that obey equations (4) and (5):
(;  ; ; ;A) =
Y

K


L
2
4
1 +
1
2
A

K


L
(
Y
i2
K

i

i
Y
j2

L

j

j
  1)
3
5
(16)
(;  ; ; ;G) =
Y

K
0


L
0
2
4
1 +
1
2
G

K
0


L
0
(
Y
i2
K
0

i

i
Y
j2

L
0

j

j
  1)
3
5
(17)
and nally the terms (  ) 2 f0; 1g orrespond to
(; ) =
N
Y
i=1
[(1  
i
) + 
i
Æ

i
;
i
℄ (18)
( ; ) =
M
Y
i=1
[(1  d
i
) + d
i
Æ

i
;
i
℄ (19)
5where the quenhed variables 
i
; d
j
2 f0; 1g model prior knowledge of bits of the plaintext and the orrupting vetor
suh that if for some i the plaintext bit 
i
is known then the thermal variable 
i
takes the quenhed plaintext value
(and similarly for the orruption vetor 
j
and 
j
). For the distribution of 
i
and d
j
we will onsider
P (
i
) = w

Æ

i
;1
+ (1  w

) Æ

i
;0
w

2 [0; 1℄ (20)
P (d
j
) = w

Æ
d
j
;1
+ (1  w

) Æ
d
j
;0
w

2 [0; 1℄ (21)
The system desribed by (12) represents a set of variables interating via multi-spin ferromagneti ouplings of nite
onnetivity, represented by a ombination of matries, in the presene of the random elds 
i
F

and 
j
F

. At  = 1
(whih orresponds to the Nishimori temperature [13℄) we will evaluate the free energy per plaintext bit
f =   lim
N!1
1
N
hlogZi
 
(22)
The marosopi observable we are interested in alulating is the overlap m = lim
N!1
1
N
P
i

i
^

i
between the plain-
text and the Bayes Marginal Posterior Maximizer (MPM) estimate of the plaintext
^

i
 sign
P

i
=

i
p(
i
jr) where
p(
i
jr) is the mirosopi state probability (12). Disorder averages hi
 
are taken over the probability distributions
(14,15,20,21) and over the distribution of the tensors A and G obeying the onstrains (8-11):
hF (A)i
A;f
~
C
i
;
~
L
i
g
=
1
N
X
fA

K


L
g
N
Y
i=1
*
Æ
2
4
X

K


L
=i2
K
A

K


L
 
~
C
i
3
5
+
P (
~
C
i
)

M
Y
j=1
*
Æ
2
4
X

K


L
=j2

L
A

K


L
 
~
L
j
3
5
+
P (
~
L
j
)
F(A) (23)
hF (G)i
G
=
1
N
0
X
fG

K
0


L
0
g
N
Y
i=1
Æ
2
4
X

K
0


L
0
=i2
K
0
A

K
0


L
0
  C
0
3
5

M
Y
j=1
Æ
2
4
X

K
0


L
0
=j
1
2

L
0
G

K
0


L
0
  1
3
5
F(G) (24)
where N and N
0
are the orresponding normalisation onstants.
The parameters w

; w

; F

; F

and  desribe the attak harateristis.
IV. THE FREE ENERGY AND DECRYPTION OBSERVABLES
The alulation generally follows that of [6, 10℄. To perform the various disorder averages we begin by invoking the
replia identity hlogZi = lim
n!0
1
n
loghZ
n
i and making the gauge transformations 
i
! 
i

i
, 
i
! 
i

i
, A

K


L
!
A

K


L
Q
i2
K

i
Q
j2

L

j
and G

K
0


L
0
! G

K
0


L
0
Q
i2
K
0

i
Q
j2

L
0

j
. This will allow us to disentangle the variables
f; g from expressions involving the tensors A and G in (16,17). Replaing the Æ funtions in (23,24) by their integral
representations allows us to perform the tensor summations, leading to:
h
A
(;  );
G
(;  ) i =
=
1
NN
0
I
Q
N
i=1
dZ
i
dX
i
(2)
2N
I
Q
M
j=1
dY
j
dV
j
(2)
2M

N
Y
i=1
D
Z
 (
~
C
i
+1)
i
X
 (C
0
+1)
i
E
P (
~
C
i
)
M
Y
j=1
D
Y
 (
~
L
j
+1)
j
V
 2
j
E
P (
~
L
j
)
 e
(
1
2
)
n
P
n
m=0
P
h
1

m
i
1
K!
(
P
N
i=1
Z
i


1
i


m
i
)
K
1
L!
(
P
M
j=1
Y
j


1
j


m
j
)
L
 e
(
1
2
)
n
P
n
m=0
P
h
1

m
i
1
K
0
!
(
P
N
i=1
X
i


1
i


m
i
)
K
0
(
P
M
j=1
V
j


1
j


m
j
)
(25)
6In the above expression we an now identify the following order parameters
q

1

m
=
N
X
i=1
Z
i


1
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whih we insert in (25) via suitably dened Æ funtions (giving rise to the Lagrange multipliers q^

1

m
, r^

1

m
,
^
t

1

m
and u^

1

m
). To proeed with the alulation one needs to assume a ertain order parameter symmetry for
the above quantities and their onjugates for all m > 1. The simplest suh assumption renders all replia m-tuples
equivalent and all order parameters within this replia symmetri sheme need only depend on the number m. This
eet an be desribed by the introdution of suitably dened distributions, the moments of whih ompletely dene
the m-index order parameters
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^
 (y) y
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(31)
where all integrals are over the interval [ 1; 1℄. The Nishimori ondition ( = 1), whih orresponds to MPM
deoding [14℄, also ensures that this simplest replia-symmetri sheme is suÆient to desribe the thermodynamially
dominant state [13, 15℄. Furthermore, it is worthwhile mentioning that extending the replia symmetri alulation
to inlude the one-step replia symmetry breaking ansatz is unlikely to modify the loation of the transition points
identied under the replia-symmetri ansatz, as has been reently shown in a similar system [16℄. Using the above
ansatz we perform the ontour integrals in (25), and trae over the spin variables; then, in the limit n! 0 we obtain:
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where the extremization is taken over the distributions dened in (28-31) and the various integrals J
??
are given by
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Averages denoted h  i
~
C
and h  i
~
L
are over the densities (6) and (7) with
~
C = 1; : : : ; C and
~
L = 1; : : : ; L. Funtional
dierentiation of (32) with respet to the densities of (28-31) results in the following saddle point equations:
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In general, the oupled set of equations (40)-(47) are to be solved numerially. Among the set of  that satisfy
equations (4) and (5) we hoose the MPM estimate of the plaintext
^
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
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i
i (thermal
average) by using Nishimori's 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(49)
from whih it an be seen that the perfet (ferromagneti) solution m = 1 is ahieved when w

= 1 (omplete
knowledge of the solution) or when
^
(x) = Æ[x   1℄. This also implies that all densities involved in (32) (x) =
f(x); : : : ;
^
 (x)g aquire the form (x) = Æ[x  1℄ giving a free energy of the form
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(50)
The physial meaning of the terms w
?
Æ[x 1℄ in (44-47) is that the aquired mirosopi knowledge gives a probabilisti
weight at the ferromagneti state. The state m = 0 is obtained if w

= F

= 0 and ^(x) =
^
(x) = Æ[x℄ (paramagneti
solution).
V. PHASE DIAGRAMS
In this setion we obtain numerial solutions for various attak senarios. In all ases studied we assume an
unbiased plaintext (p

= 1=2; F

= 0); for brevity we refer to the remaining bias parameter, the orruption level
denoted p

in previous setions, simply as p. All experiments have been arried out using a regular ryptosystem with
K = L = 2, being the original ryptosystem suggested in [4℄. In priniple, one an use any set of regular or irregular
matries, provided one identies the orresponding dynamial transition point. However, having been thoroughly
studied previously, the urrent onstrution serves as a partiularly suited benhmark.
Solving the oupled equations (40-47) we typially observe that for suÆiently small values of p the ferromagneti
state m = 1 is the only stable solution whereas at a orruption value that marks the dynamial (spinodal) transition
p
s
, an exponential number of solutions with m 6= 1 are reated (either suboptimal ferromagneti or paramagneti,
depending on the values of (K;C;L)). For all p > p
s
perfet deryption will be diÆult to obtain. This transition
also denes the orruption level below whih an unauthorized attaker, that have aquired partial information of the
seret keys, will be suessful.
We will onentrate on two main attaks: (i) The attaker has partial knowledge of the keys (primarily the matrix
B). (ii) The attaker has partial mirosopi knowledge of the plaintext and/or orruption vetor.
In gure 2 we present a phase diagram desribing regions with perfet (m = 1) or partial/null (jmj < 1) deryption
suess as evaluated from solving equations (32) and (48). We plot the dynamial transition orruption level p
s
as
a funtion of the private key frational knowledge  for dierent values of w

and w

(we have set p

= 1=2 whih
orresponds to an `unbiased' plaintext). In the limit  = 0 (i.e., no knowledge of the matries), while m = 1 may be a
stable solution, the deryption dynamis is fully dominated by jmj < 1 states. For  = 1 the ryptosystem desribes
a spei MN ode and perfet deryption an our below p
s
.
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FIG. 2: Phase diagram of the spinodal orruption-rate against the frational knowledge of the private key  for a (K;C;L) =
(2; 6; 2) ryptosystem for (w

; w

) = (0; 0) (solid line) and (0:2; 0:2) (dashed line). Mirosopi knowledge of the plaintext and
the orrupting vetor enlarges the perfet deryption area, as expeted.
The interation between the sparsely (4) and densely (5) onneted deryption omponents is non-linear and non-
trivial; however, as a rst approximation one an view the frational matrix knowledge  as hanging the eetive
sparse omponent, whih is the main ontributor in the deryption proess. To that end  will have a diret impat
on the eetive ode rate N=(M), the average onnetivity C and the onnetivity distribution. It is lear that
at an eetive ode rate 1 ( = N=M = 1=3 in the ase of the parameters used in gure 2) deryption is even not
theoretially feasible. The reason gure 2 points to a possibility of deryption below this value is due to additional
information brought in by the dense omponents we ignored in this simplisti desription.
We also examined the eet of prior mirosopi knowledge of the plaintext/orrupting vetor (w

; w

> 0) on the
area of perfet deryption; whih learly inreases with the knowledge provided, as expeted. Also this an be viewed
as a hange to the eetive ode rate. This time, the partial mirosopi knowledge of either plaintext or orrupting
vetor (or both) serves to redue the eetive number of variables and hene the ode rate itself; lower ode rate will
typially allow for perfet deryption in worse orruption onditions as an be seen in gure 2
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FIG. 3: Phase diagrams of the spinodal orruption-rates against the frational knowledge of the private key  for a (K;C;L) =
(2; 6; 2) ryptosystem. Left piture: (w

; w

) = (0:1; 0) (solid line) and (0; 0:1) (dashed line). Right piture: (w

; w

) = (0:2; 0)
(solid line) and (0; 0:2) (dashed line). For suÆiently large -values mirosopi knowledge of the orrupting vetor beomes
more important to the unauthorized user than that of the plaintext; this eet beomes more emphasized as the fration of
known bits inreases.
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FIG. 4: Left: Comparison between two dierent ryptosystems with (K;C;L) = (2; 3; 2) (solid line) and (K;C;L) = (2; 4; 2)
(dashed line). Smaller C-values orrespond to higher rate odes and lead to smaller regions in parameter spae where perfet
deryption is possible. Right: Overlap m as funtion of the orrupting-rate p obtained from equation (48) for a (K;C;L) =
(2; 6; 2) ryptosystem and along the line  = 0:8 for (w

; w

) = (0:2; 0) (solid line) and (w

; w

) = (0; 0) (dashed line).
To understand the impliation of these results let us assume using the ryptosystem desribed in gure 2 at a
orruption level hosen of p = 0:1 (whih is hosen muh smaller that p
s
to inrease the deryption reliability). In
this ase knowing about 70% of the matries (seret keys) will be suÆient for derypting the iphertext. True, there
is still a need to know the dense matrix D
 1
for extrating the plaintext itself and the exposed fration of the seret
key is signiant; but still there is a weakness that may be exploited by a skillful attaker.
To ompare the importane of prior mirosopi knowledge of plaintext versus that of the orrupting vetor we
plotted in gure 3 the phase diagram for (w

; w

) = f(0:1; 0); (0:2; 0)g and (w

; w

) = f(0; 0:1); (0; 0:2)gwhih desribe
two omplementary senarios (left and right gures respetively). The eet is quite similar, taking into aount the
information provided by the two vetors (the plaintext is unbiased but of length N while the orruption vetor is
biased but of lengthM). For high -values mirosopi knowledge of the orrupting vetor beomes more informative
than that of the plaintext, an eet whih beomes more emphasized as the fration of known bits inreases.
In gure 4 we ompare two ryptosystems with (K;C;L) = (2; 4; 2) and (K;C;L) = (2; 3; 2) for (w

; w

) = (0; 0).
We see that smaller C values (i.e., higher ode rates) will redue the area of perfet deryption. On the one hand,
this will inrease the seret information required for perfet deryption at eah orruption level; on the other hand it
will redue the orruption level that an be used and will expose the ryptosystem to attaks based on an exhaustive
searh of orruption vetors.
The seurity of a ryptosystem may be ompromised without a full reovery of the plaintext; also partial reovery of
the plaintext may pose a signiant threat. To study the eet of partial knowledge of the matries and plaintext on
the ability to obtain high overlap between the derypted iphertext and plaintext, we onduted several experiments,
an example of whih appears in gure 4. Here we show the overlap obtained m as funtion of the orruption-rate p
for a spei ryptosystem (K;C;L) = (2; 6; 2) along the line  = 0:8 and for two dierent hoies of w

. Prior to
the dynamial transition points both iphertexts are derypted perfetly; this orresponds to orruption and partial
knowledge levels below the solid and dashed lines of gure 2.
Above the dynamial transition point, new suboptimal solutions are reated and the overlap value obtained dete-
riorates with the orruption level. However, the two dierent hoies of w

-values lead to two dierent deterioration
patterns: while overlap in the system with no mirosopi knowledge of the plaintext deteriorates very rapidly, the
system with w

= 0:2 provides solutions with high overlap values even if the orruption is high. As a onsequene, we
see that the eet of mirosopi knowledge goes beyond a shift in the dynamial transition point; it also inuenes
deryption beyond that point (in fat, it goes even beyond Shannon's limit).
VI. BASIN OF ATTRACTION
The inreasingly narrowing basin of attration for the ferromagneti solution, as the onnetivity values K;C and
L ! 1, is entral to the seurity level oered by the ryptosystem. The eet has been reported in a number of
papers in the statistial physis [4, 12℄ and information-theory [5℄ literature; in this setion we will show that the
11
basin of attration shrinks as the onnetivity inreases, to a value of O(1=K) as K;C !1.
To provide a rough evaluation of the basin of attration (BOA) for obtaining the ferromagneti solution we fous on
Eq. (2) in the limit K;C !1. BOA learly depends on the algorithm used; here we fous on the Belief Propagation
(BP) algorithm, whih is empirially known to be the best pratial algorithm for solving problems of the urrent
type. As far as we explored, no other shemes suh as the naive mean eld and the Belief Revision algorithms exhibit
better performane than BP, whih implies that our onsideration on BP is at least of a ertain pratial signiane
(Survey Propagation [9℄ has not yet been tested for these systems).
Let us represent prior knowledge on plain text  and noise  (in Ising spin representation) as the prior probabilities
P
o
i
(
i
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exp(F
i

i
)
2 osh(F
i
)
; (51)
P
o
j
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j
) =
exp(F
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j
)
2 osh(F
j
)
; (52)
respetively. Here, the parameters F
i
and F
j
express ondene of the prior knowledge per variable, whih is a
generalization of the global prior terms F

; F

used earlier. Notie that this representation inludes the ase that
ertain bits are ompletely determined by setting jF
i
j(or jF
j
j) ! 1, enabling us to over various senarios. In
the following, we assume that the fration of ompletely determined bits is less than 1 when N;M ! 1. Given
prior probabilities (51) and (52), and the indiator funtion (;  ; ; ;A) whih is the alternative to parity hek
equation (2), the Bayesian framework provides the posterior probability
P
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P
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P
o
j
(
i
)
Z
; (53)
where Z is the normalization onstant. Using Eq. (53), one an determine the best possible ation for minimizing
the expeted value of a given ost funtion [14℄. As a ost funtion, we selet here the Hamming distane between
the orret plain text  and its estimates
^
, L(
^
; ) = N  
P
N
i=1
^

i

i
; this seletion naturally oers the maximizer of
posterior marginal (MPM) deoding
^

i
= sign(m

i
) as the optimal estimation strategy, where
m

i
=
X
;

i
P
post
(;  ); (54)
is the average of spin 
i
over the posterior probability and sign(x) = 1 for x > 0 and  1, otherwise.
Computational ost for an exat evaluation of the spin average (54) inreases as O(2
N+M
), whih implies that
MPM deoding is pratially diÆult. An alternative approah is to resort to an approximation suh as BP. In the
urrent ase, this means to iteratively solving the oupled equations (for details of the derivation see [5, 10℄)
m^

i
= J

Y
l2L

()ni
m

l
Y
j2L

()
m

j
; m^

j
= J

Y
l2L

()
m

l
Y
k2L

()nj
m

k
; (55)
m

i
= tanh(F
i
+
X
2M

(i)n
ath(m^

i
)); m

j
= tanh(F
j
+
X
2M

(j)n
ath(m^

j
)); (56)
where J



Q
l2L

()

l
Q
j2L

()

j

, L

() and L

() are the sets of indies of non-zero elements in th row of
A and B, respetively, and M

(i) and M

(j) are similarly dened for olumns of A and B, respetively. L

()ni
denotes a set of indies in L

other than i, and similarly for other symbols. The variables m
=
i
and m^
=
i
represent
pseudo posterior averages of 
i
(or 
j
) when the th hek J

is left out, and the inuene of a newly added J

on 
i
(or 
j
), respetively (see [5, 10℄ for details). Using m^

i
, the posterior average m

i
is obtained as
m

i
= tanh(F
i
+
X
2M

(i)
ath(m^

i
)): (57)
Let us investigate the ondition neessary for nding the orret solution by iterating Eqs.(55) and (56) in the limit
K;C ! 1. For this purpose, we rst employ the gauge transformation 
i
m

i
! m

i
, 
i
m^

i
! m^

i
, 
j
m

j
! m

j
,

j
m^

j
! m^

j
and J


Q
l2L

()

l
Q
j2L

()

j

! 1. This deouples the quenhed random variables 
i
and 
j
from
Eq.(55), as J

beomes independent of the quenhed variables, and the BP equations an be expressed as
m^

i
=
Y
l2L

()ni
m

l
Y
j2L

()
m

j
; m^

j
=
Y
l2L

()
m

l
Y
k2L

()nj
m

k
; (58)
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m

i
= tanh(F

i

i
+
X
2M

(i)n
ath(m^

i
)); m

j
= tanh(F

j

j
+
X
2M

(j)n
ath(m^

j
)): (59)
The expression of the orret solution is also onverted to m

i
= 1 and m

j
= 1. Notie that any state whih is
haraterized by dereasing absolute values jm

i
j < 1   " and jm

i
j < 1   " for an arbitrary xed positive number
" > 0 is attrated to a loally stable solution m^

i
 0, m^

j
 0, m

i
= tanh(F

i

i
) and m

j
= tanh(F

j

j
) for K !1
in a single update sine produts on the right hand sides of Eq. (58) vanish. To provide a rough evaluation of the
BOA for the orret (ferromagneti) solution m

i
= 1 and m

j
= 1, let us assume that m

i
and m

j
are randomly
distributed at 1   "(K) and  (1  "(K)) with probabilities 1  p(K) and p(K), respetively, where "(K) and p(K)
are small parameters to haraterize the BOA for a large K. Under this assumption, m^

i
and m^

j
are distributed at
(1  "(K))
K+L
 (1  "(K))
K
with probability (1 (1  2p(K))
K+L
)=2  (1 (1  2p(K))
K
)=2, respetively. If
either (1  "(K))
K
or (1  2p(K))
K
is negligible, the absolute values of m

i
and m

j
beome suÆiently smaller than
1, and therefore, the state is trapped in a loally stable solution in the seond iteration [19℄. This implies that the
ritial ondition is given by "(K)  O(1=K) and p(K)  O(1=K) for large K. In terms of the marosopi overlap,
this means m
0
r
 1 O(1=K).
VII. RELIABILITY
Unlike most of the ommonly used ryptosystems whih are based on a deterministi deryption proedure, the ur-
rent ryptosystem relies on a probabilisti deryption proess. The evaluation of deryption suess for an authorized
user is therefore as important as assessing the level of robustness against attaks.
In pratial senarios, deryption suess generally depends on the plaintext size. Analysis of nite size eets in
the belief propagation based deryption proedure is diÆult. A prinipled alternative that we pursue here is based
on evaluating the average error exponent of the urrent ryptosystem; this provides the expeted error-level at any
given orruption level when maximum likelihood deoding is employed, and therefore represents a lower bound to the
expeted error-rate. Moreover, the orruption levels employed are far below the ritial (thermodynami) transition
point, we therefore assume that belief propagation deryption will provide similar performane to maximum likelihood
deoding; learly, the lower bound will beome looser as we get lose to the dynamial transition point.
The average blok error rate P
B
(p) (i.e., erroneous derypted plaintexts) takes the form
P
B
(p) = e
 ME(p)
; (60)
where E(p) is the average error exponent per noise level p and M the length of the iphertext (in the partiular ase
of LDPC odes we assume that short loops, whih ontribute polynomially to the blok error probability [17℄, have
been removed). The quantity P
B
(p) represents the probability by whih andidate solutions f; g are drawn from
the set of those satisfying equation (4) (with  = 1; authorized deryption) other than the ones orresponding to the
true plaintext and orrupting vetor,  =  and  = , respetively. To evaluate this probability we introdue the
indiator funtion
	( ) = lim
!1
lim

1;2
!
h
Z

1
1
( ;
1
) Z

2
2
( ;
2
)
i

1
=
2
=
(61)
where   = f; ;Ag olletively denotes the set of quenhed variables. The power  2 [0; 1℄ is used in onjuntion
with the partition funtions
Z
1
( ;
1
) =
X
 6=
X
 6=
e
 
1
H(; )
Z
2
( ;
2
) =
X

X

e
 
2
H(; )
(62)
to provide an indiator funtion as explained below. The Hamiltonian H(;  ) is given by (13) and the trae over spin
variables is restrited to those ongurations satisfying equation (4). The above partition funtions Z
1
and Z
2
dier
only in the exlusion of the true plaintext and orrupting vetor in the trae over variables; this enables us to identify
instanes where the maximum likelihood deoder hooses solutions that do not math the true (quenhed variable)
vetors. The Hamiltonian (13) is proportional to the magnetizations m

() =
1
N
P
i

i
and m

( ) =
1
M
P
i

i
.
Therefore, if the true plaintext and orrupting vetors have the highest magnetizations (deryption suess), the
Boltzmann fator exp[ H(;  )℄ will dominate the sum over states in Z
2
in the limit  ! 1 and 	( ) = 0.
Alternatively, if some other vetors  6=  and  6=  have the highest magnetizations of all andidates (deoding
failure), its Boltzmann fator will dominate both Z
1
and Z
2
so that 	( ) = 1. Separate temperatures 
1;2
and powers

1;2
have been introdued to determine whether obtained solutions are physial or not (values of these parameters
will be obtained via the zero-entropy ondition).
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FIG. 5: Reliability exponent (63) as a funtion of the orruption level p for the ase K = L = 2 and rates R = 1=2 (dashed
line) and R = 1=4 (solid line).
To derive the average error exponent E(p) we take the logarithm of the above indiator funtion averaged with
respet to the disorder variables   = f; ;Ag
E(p) = lim
M!1
1
M
log h	( )i
 
(63)
The evaluation of (63) is similar in spirit to the analysis of setion IV. For details of this alulation we refer the
reader to [18℄ where we also study and ompare the reliability and average error exponents of various low-density
parity-hek odes.
Results desribing E(p) for authorised deryption of the ryptosystem [4℄ are presented in gure 5 where we plot
E(p) as funtion of the orruption level p for (K;C;L) = (2; 8; 2) (ode-rate 1/4) and (K;C;L) = (2; 4; 2) (ode-rate
1/2) ryptosystems. It is lear that deryption errors deay very fast with the system size as we go away from the
ritial orruption level. For instane, in the ase of R = 1=4, using a orruption level of p = 0:13 (Shannon's limit is
at p = 0:20) and a modest iphertext size of M = 1000 will result in a negligible blok error probability P
B
= 10
 11
.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have analyzed several seurity issues related to the reently suggested publi-key ryptosystem of [4℄.
The suggested ryptosystem is based on the omputational diÆulty of deomposing a dense matrix into a ombination
of dense and sparse matries (obeying ertain statistis) whih is a known hard omputational problem. We have
onsidered several attak senarios in whih unauthorized parties have aquired partial knowledge of one or more of
the private keys and/or mirosopi knowledge of the plaintext and/or the `orrupting vetor'. The analysis follows
standard statistial mehanial methods of dealing with diluted spin systems within replia symmetri onsiderations.
Of entral importane to the unauthorized deryption is the dynamial transition whih denes deryption suess in
pratial situations. Our phase diagrams show the dynamial threshold as a funtion of the partial aquired knowledge
of the private key; they desribe regions with perfet- (m = 1) or partial/null deryption suess (jmj < 1).
Publi-key ryptosystems play an important role in modern ommuniations. The inreasing demand for seure
transmission of information has lead to the invention of novel ryptosystems in reent years. To this extent and
based on the insight gained by statistial physis analyses of error-orreting odes a new family of ryptosystems
was suggested in [4℄. This paper onstitutes a rst step in studying this lass of ryptosystems by onsidering the
potential suess of possible attaks.
Several future researh diretions aimed at improving the seurity and reliability of this ryptosystem may in-
lude studying the eÆay of irregular ode onstrutions and the use of novel deryption methods suh as survey
propagation [9℄ for pushing the dynamial transition point loser to the information theoreti limits.
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